rates most efficiently from each other the complexity of what there is in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s text, and the process by which the reader has encountered it. In a most original and powerful way, this book uses ultra-academic methods: numbered paragraphs, enumeration of points or arguments, recapitulations, to make one go further than acquiring a set piece of academic knowledge. It helps one think. This is a very fine book indeed.

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David Papineau’s _Thinking About Consciousness_ is an important book. It is a powerful defence of physicalism about the mental and it takes an approach that seems particularly fruitful in dealing with the mysteries of consciousness: it focuses not on what makes conscious _states_ special among other physical states, but rather on what it is about the _concepts_ we apply to these states that makes consciousness seemingly inexplicable. Papineau argues, rather convincingly, that our very quest for an explanation of what makes certain physical states conscious is driven by a confusion, a confusion that has its roots in the special role that consciousness concepts play in our cognitive architecture.

Papineau has all the right views on the mind–body problem: he is a physicalist, a qualia realist, and he holds that zombies are conceivable. Papineau shares this basic outlook with many philosophers writing about consciousness (for instance, Loar, Block, McLaughlin and Tye). In the past decades, this combination of views came under attack from philosophers presenting novel versions of Descartes’s conceivability argument (Nagel, Jackson, Kripke, White, Chalmers and Nida-Rümelin). These arguments try to establish that the conceivability of zombies, assuming qualia realism, is not compatible with physicalism. Since there are powerful reasons to hold physicalism, as well as qualia realism and the conceivability of zombies, many physicalists showed great interest in these arguments. Most of the physicalist answers to the conceivability arguments turn on some account or other of the nature of phenomenal concepts. It is common ground among physicalists of Papineau’s ilk that it is the peculiar nature of phenomenal concepts—that is, that they pick out their referent directly—that gives rise to the conceivability of zombies, but that this peculiarity of phenomenal concepts is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that they pick out a _physical state_. Furthermore, it seems there is no reason—at least no a priori reason—to suppose that concepts with that very feature could not be themselves physical, picking out physical states.
At this point the dualist might try to resist—she might say that no physical analogue of real phenomenal concepts can really be a concept. With that, the debate might come to a standoff, unless somebody undertakes the project of working out a specific account of phenomenal concepts that bears out this basic insight. In two important chapters of his book, Papineau is doing just that (Chs 5 and 7).

Papineau’s book gives a full presentation of physicalism (Ch. 1), qualia realism, and the unanalysability of qualia concepts (Ch. 2). It also contains his answer to the conceivability arguments (Chs 3 and 5). His answer is rather quick. He thinks they are a non-starter: one could run an argument exactly analogous to the conceivability arguments against physicalism, with the conclusion that Cicero is not identical to Tully. This would be a successful modus tollens, if there ever was one. Papineau argues like this: the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are unanalyzable, that is, they refer directly, and not by description (just like the concept ‘pain’ is, by the way). So one cannot explain away the apparent contingency of ‘Cicero is Tully’ according to the Kripkean recipe for explaining away the apparent contingency of a posteriori necessary truths. This reply, though clever, does not convince. Especially, it would not convince an advocate of the conceivability arguments, according to whom names do refer by description. A different reply is available to the physicalist, and it has to do with unpacking the notion of the ‘direct reference’ of phenomenal concepts in a manner compatible with physicalism. Papineau does not pursue this line, but his theory of phenomenal concepts fits right into it. He rather concludes that the conceivability arguments cannot explain the tenacious ‘intuition of distinctness’, that is, the intuition that consciousness is not physical. In chapter six, he argues for the claim, familiar from his previous work, that the intuition of distinctness does not derive its strength from the intuitive plausibility of the conceivability arguments, but rather its source is a cognitive illusion he calls the ‘Antipathetic Fallacy’ facilitated by the cognitive peculiarity of qualia concepts (Papineau, ‘Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71, 1993). I am now going to focus on chapters five and seven of the book, Papineau’s theory of phenomenal concepts, since this is the part of his book that contains his most novel, creative contributions to the debate at hand.

Consciousness appears puzzling for many reasons—not just because zombies are conceivable. We are directly aware of our own conscious states in ways no one else could be. We seem to be infallible when we make judgements about our own conscious states in the present tense case. We seem to have direct, unmediated insight into its nature. These desiderata suggest that a successful account of phenomenal concepts will have to posit a very intimate connection between conscious states and the concepts we form of them. Loar (‘Phenomenal States’, in Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) has suggested that in the case of phenomenal concepts the experience itself serves as a mode of presentation
which, presumably, guides the concept to the relevant experience. This idea, as Papineau points out, does not help if by ‘mode of presentation’ we mean a property that we can already think and which we can therefore use to think of an entity which has those properties. Papineau’s suggestion instead is a variation on the idea that (certain) phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by the phenomenal experiences they refer to. On his view, a current phenomenal experience (or, as the case might be, a memory or imaginative recreation of a phenomenal experience type or token) is literally part of the token concept currently applied to it, and the experience partly determines what the concept refers to. Papineau says that phenomenal concepts are formed by prefixing states of perceptual classification—and imaginative re-creation of perceptual states—with the operator ‘the experience …’. (By the way, he admits later in the book that he does not assume that all experiences are representational, so this model involving perceptual states serves merely as illustration not as generalization.) ‘It may be helpful to compare the model I am defending to the use of quotation marks,’ he comments on page 117, though in a footnote to the same page he adds, ‘I am slightly hesitant about highlighting this analogy, given that quotation raises its own puzzles.’

If this is so then there will of course be an intimate connection between phenomenal experience and phenomenal concepts. In particular, on this theory, any token of a phenomenal concept (of the appropriate, first-personish kind) will contain a token of the experience, and so certain judgements involving the concept will be infallible. This will be evidently so for judgements that use the same state of perceptual classification or re-creation to identify an experience and to classify it. For example, I might form both a singular referring expression of a particular experience and a general phenomenal concept on the basis of the same token experience. My judgement ‘This particular experience is of this experience type’ would then be infallible since the very experience I am talking about is partly constitutive of the phenomenal concept, and that fact, according to the theory, guarantees that the concept applies to it.

Now there are lots of questions that this account of phenomenal concepts gives rise to, most pressingly:

1. Exactly what does it mean for an experience to be within the scope of ‘the experience …’ operator?
2. How is the reference of type phenomenal concepts determined? In particular,
   a. Why does being partly constituted by a token of the reference play a role in fixing the reference of type phenomenal concepts?
   b. How does the reference of a type phenomenal concept that is partly constituted by, say, a token reddish experience within the scope of ‘the experience …’ operator get to be reddish experience, rather than dark reddish experience, or vermillion experience, as the case might be?
Papineau does not really provide a detailed answer. He hopes to give a blanket answer to all these questions at once by invoking the causal-teleological account of meaning:

We should also note that phenomenal concepts are compound referring terms (composed of an 'experience operator' and a 'perceptual filling') … [A] causal or teleosemantic account of phenomenal concepts will view the contribution of the parts to the semantic value of the whole as depending on the systematic contribution which those parts make to the causes or biological functions of the wholes they enter into. (p. 117)

This is no more than a promissory note. The causal-teleological account of reference is far from being satisfactorily worked out for other concepts, and there are a lot of questions about how it would work in the case of phenomenal concepts. Papineau invokes the conceptual role of phenomenal concepts as the actual mechanism through which teleosemantics operates in the case of some but not all phenomenal concepts. More needs to be said about these questions before the quotational account can truly be called a theory of phenomenal concepts.

Another interesting problem about the reference of phenomenal concepts arises in the context of what Ned Block dubbed the 'harder problem of consciousness'. Very crudely put, the harder problem is that we can never tell, even if we know all the relevant physical and functional facts, whether a creature that is functionally relevantly similar, but physically quite different from us, is conscious. Papineau agrees with this and thinks it follows that phenomenal concepts must be vague because otherwise there would be facts about phenomenal states that we could never find out about (at least not under their phenomenal description), and he thinks that a physicalist cannot accommodate such a result. So an epistemological problem about consciousness leads to a semantic problem. We cannot know if chipmunks are conscious, and that is, it seems, because there is no matter of fact about whether they are conscious. This is a rather astonishing conclusion, all the more so, since (though this is not discussed by Papineau) this seems to generalize to fellow human beings. The consideration underlying these claims is this. Given physicalism, it is hard to see how one's subjective concepts of consciousness could refer to objective, determinate physical or functional properties that are projectable across individuals. If there are, as seems to be, many distinct physical or functional properties that are shared by phenomenal states, then it is doubtful if there could be a matter of fact about which state one's phenomenal concepts refer to. This same reason, however, plausibly renders the question of whether fellow human beings share phenomenal properties with us similarly indeterminate:

So phenomenal concepts serve to track facts involving material properties. But which material properties precisely? There are various different candidate material properties .... Given this, ... we can conclude that phenomenal concepts refer indeterminately to any of those material properties. (p. 199)
What does it mean to hold such a view? Considering functionally relevantly similar but physically different doppelgangers, Papineau explains:

My claim is not that it is vague how it is for the doppelganger. The doppelganger’s experience will feel as it does, and there is no need to suppose that this in itself is less than definite …. Rather, my claim is that our phenomenal term ‘seeing something red’, the one whose exercise involves instances of reactivations of our own red experiences, is not well focused enough for it to be determinate whether or not the doppelganger’s experience fall under it. (pp. 199–200)

This seems reassuring, but a bit confusing. If there is a matter of fact about the doppelganger’s experience, why cannot we say what it is? The analogy Papineau seems to have in mind is with vague terms, like ‘bald’. There is nothing indeterminate about how many hairs a borderline case person has, it is simply indeterminate whether he (or she) is bald. So there is an underlying set of determinate phenomena that we can think about. Phenomenal concepts, however, do not operate like ‘bald’. ‘Bald’ will have cases that fall clearly under it and cases that clearly do not fall under it, and than a range of cases where it is unclear whether they fall under it or not. A phenomenal concept, like ‘reddish experience’, on the other hand, is not simply vague, it is indeterminate between a range of well-defined states. Applied to oneself, there does not seem to be any indeterminacy (though, if Papineau is right, objectively there is indeterminacy even in the first-person case), which might be explained by the fact that all of the states between which the concept is indeterminate are present at the same time. Applied to others, there is always indeterminacy (though that is not subjectively obvious, either). It is hard to see what determinate fact there could be about the doppelganger’s experience that our concept is not fine-tuned enough to pick up. How can we even conceptualize there being a fact about how her experience is if no phenomenal concept of ours can capture this fact?

Mysteries of consciousness continue to abound. Papineau has produced a very rich, thought-provoking book about them. Anybody thinking about the issues will find reading it rewarding.

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The variety of moral realism defended here endorses several eye-catching claims: moral standards are true independent of actual or idealized inquirers’ attitudes; moral properties are non-natural properties; at least some moral