N.B.: This copy of the Statement of Exceptions was scanned and ... I caution
you that some characters do not translate easily across the net.
Therefore, caution should be exercised in making direct quotations since
there will inevitably be transmission quirks. Footnotes are enclosed in
brackets []. Underlined words are between + signs. The words "kerygma"
and "didache" should always be in italics. Other words in italics are
between / signs. [Kendall Harmon]
IN THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF A BISHOP
James M. Stanton, Bishop of
Dallas, et al.,
Presenters,
v.
The Rt. Rev. Walter C. Righter,
Respondent.
+STATEMENT OF EXCEPTIONS+
+Preliminary Statement+
The Presenters file this Statement of Exceptions to the Court's Opinion and Judgment of May 15, 1996, in response to the Court's statement that exceptions could be taken.[1] The exceptions relate to the Court's decision including Items I through 6 on page 26 of the Court's Order. It is clear from the Court's Opinion that the Court has committed several fundamental errors to which the Presenters take exception. Correction of these errors would require judgment for the Presenters on their Motions for Summary Judgment.
+I. Exceptions to Courts Decision on Count 1+
The Court erred in finding as a matter of law that Canon IV.1.1(2)(1994)
(cf.Canon IV.1.1(6)[1996]) does not apply to "any doctrine" as stated by
the text of the canons, but only to a subcategory of doctrine, denominated
by the Court as "Core Doctrine" without any basis or definition in the
Constitution, Canons or Book of Common Prayer (that is, the entire Book of
Common Prayer, comprising 1,001 pages, which this pleading intends to cover
whenever it refers to that Book, unless otherwise stated.) The Court had no
authority to redefine enforceable doctrine as it did. 1. The Canon in
question speaks of holding and teaching "+any+ doctrine" without
capitalizing the word "doctrine" whereas Article VIII of the Constitution
and Canon IV. 1.2 (1994) capitalize the word "Doctrine." Accordingly, the
text of the holding and teaching Canon must be construed to provide support
for a more comprehensive use of the word and not for the restricted use
adopted by the Court. While the Presenters do not assert that the
ordination vow involves any narrower meaning of the word than does the
Canon at issue under Count 1, there is no way that the text can be read to
allow a more comprehensive meaning for the word under the Canon at issue in
Count 2 than under the Canon at issue in Count 1. 2. The Court's
identification of its term "Core Doctrine" with the views of some New
Testament scholars who argue for a distinction between kerygma and didache
during the period of the New Testament Church, is not based on any standard
which is part of the doctrine, discipline or polity of this Church, nor is
there any such standard on which to base the Court's view that this kerygma
evolved and was given expression through the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.
The distinction is at best what the Court calls a matter of "theology" and
which, it cautions, is not to be confused with Doctrine (Opinion II.D.,
page 7). The elements of kerygma identified by the Court as the content of
"Core Doctrine" (Opinion II.B., page 5) do not include, for example,
doctrines such as the doctrine of the Trinity, Jesus becoming incarnate
from the Virgin Mary, the forgiveness of sins or belief in the one holy
catholic apostolic Church and the communion of saints, not to mention
Justification by Faith (Article XI, Articles of Religion). The term "Core
Doctrine" does not appear in the lectures of C. H. Dodd published in 1936
under the title +The Apostolic Preaching+ and referred to by the Court as
its authority for crafting that term. The Court's reliance on Dodd's work
involves a category error confusing the marks of early preaching to the
unevangelized with the internal doctrine and discipline of the Church as it
developed through the Rule of Faith and early Creeds. Indeed, were one to
read past the first few pages of that brief publication that person would
find at page 53 Dodd's discussion of St. Matthew's Gospel as follows.[2] 3.
The restrictive definition of Core Doctrine puts in question the status of
provisions in the Catechism dealing with faith and morals. The Court's
expression of opinion that "Core Doctrine" is what is binding on all the
baptized carries with it the necessary implication that this is a distinct
category of belief. This conflicts with the text of the portion of the Book
of Common Prayer setting out the Baptismal Vows (pages 302-303), the
Baptismal Covenant (pages 304-305) and the Renewal of Baptismal Vows (pages
292-294). 4. The Court has misread the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral 1886,
1888 (BCP pages 876-878) as a reflection of its understanding of "Core
Doctrine," as well as by the Court's implication that "scripture" and the
"creeds" are described by the Quadrilateral for "use in worship" rather
than providing doctrinal and moral standards. In fact, the texts of the
resolutions show that the +reference+ is to a "sacred" "deposit of
Christian Faith and Order" in the 1886 text and to "Articles" in the 1888
text which deposit includes "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments as the revealed Word of God." (This is in sharp distinction to
the Court's strained view of "Holy Scripture [as] the story of our
relationship to God." The corresponding "Article" adopted by the Lambeth
Bishops in 1888 describes "[t]he Holy Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments, as 'containing all things necessary to salvation,' and as being
the rule and ultimate standard of faith." This is in equally sharp
distinction to this Court's obvious effort to obscure its fundamental
disagreement with the Quadrilateral by inserting the word "rule" into the
following sentence which is, without the word "rule," a direct
contradiction of the Quadrilateral: "It [the Holy Scriptures] is not at
heart a book of doctrine or discipline." (Opinion II.C., page 7) Even with
the word "rule" the sentence jars the heart and mind of any person whose
beliefs are +grounded+ in the Holy Scriptures. This failure to acknowledge
the centrality and full authority of Holy Scripture in the life of the
Christian Church is reflected in the unfortunate content of the Court's
decision. 5. The Court has misread the decision in the +Bishop Brown Case+
by reading a case which was brought against a Bishop who was teaching
contrary to the doctrine of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as if the Court
in that case had been deciding that the only basis for a decision in a case
under Canon IV.1.1(2) was the basis for that Court's decision as to Bishop
Brown.[3]
+II. Exceptions to The Court's Decision on Count 2+
The Court erred in finding that the action of the Respondent subject to the
Presentment did not violate the Oath of Conformity as charged in Count 2.
1. In Part II.E. of its Opinion, the Court implies that the use of
Ecclesiastical Discipline to hold persons liable for presentment for
"ordaining a person who is practicing immorality, such as adultery, theft,
or assault" may exist "in the absence of a canon or resolution." This
position ignores the fact that the Canons in Title III require a finding
that each ordinand has lived a moral life.[4] Since the Court admits in
Part III.D. of its Opinion that the 1979 Resolution of General Convention
A-53s states traditional teaching, there is no question but that under that
traditional teaching the Canons at issue here were violated. Furthermore,
no teaching has been adopted by General Convention or by this Court which
would permit bishops to find that an ordinand openly living in same sex
relationships was living a moral life or was a wholesome example. The
Court specifically states that it is not giving an opinion on the morality
of same gender relationships or the wholesomeness of the example provided
by ordinands in such relationships, so it cannot find that the Respondent
complied with his ordination vows by finding that the ordinand in question
was living a moral life and was a wholesome example. If he did not make
such a finding, then he did not comply, and disciplinary action should have
been taken. 2. The Court's citation of George A. Lindbeck's +The Nature of
Doctrine+ (Philadelphia, 1984) for his comprehensive overview of the issues
central to this case is puzzling at best because Lindbeck's
cultural-linguistic analysis is so far from the Court's approach. In
Chapter 4 of that work, Lindbeck makes no distinction such as the Court
makes between kerygma and didache. His view that "[t]he only theories of
doctrine that need to be taken seriously for our purposes are regulative
[or rule making] and modified propositional ones" does not distinguish
between what this Court calls "Core Doctrine" and what it calls traditional
doctrinal teaching (or use the terminology the Court uses in the way the
Court does so). Thus he makes distinctions in his taxonomy of doctrine,
but there is not a distinction between a core and a perimeter and his
examples of doctrine include trinitarian and christological as well as
those relating to participation in war and slavery. Most importantly for
purposes of this case he recognizes the danger of conceding to attacks on
doctrine either because a matter of belief has not been seriously
challenged before or because under other circumstances it was a trivial
one. He quotes (pg. 75) Luther on this point: If I profess with the
loudest voice and clearest exposition every portion of the truth of God
except precisely that little point which the world and the devil are at
that moment attacking, I am not confessing Christ, however boldly I may be
professing Christ. Where the battle rages, there the loyalty of the
soldier is proved. To be steady on all battle fronts besides is mere
flight and disgrace if he flinches at that point. 3. The Court misapplies
the position of Richard Hooker to the facts of this case since neither
Hooker nor, for that matter, the House of Bishops of the Church of England
would consider the question of same gender sexual relations a matter as to
which the Holy Scriptures have not provided any standard of obedience. See
+Issues In Human Sexuality+, paragraph 2.29. Hooker's view about what may
be "left ... unto the careful discretion of the Church" only applies where
Scripture has not provided any law. 4. The Court's assertion (Opinion
III.C., page 10) that the Church has changed its teaching or marriage is at
best arguable and is not borne out as footnote 9 suggests by comparison of
the 1928 and 1979 marriage services. 5. The Court has introduced a
dangerous notion that questioning and challenging a traditional teaching
can have the effect of vitiating the canonical force of the teaching. This
notion is (1) not supported by any language of the Constitution, Canons or
Book of Common Prayer, or by any Resolutions of General Convention, (2)
impossible to apply because the Court provides no standards for deciding
when questioning and challenging reaches the level which has the
invalidating effect, and (3) open to grave abuse and is particularly
destructive because in the Episcopal Church even some Bishops, who have
vowed to guard the faith and unity of the Church, contest such traditional
teaching as the uniqueness and finality of Jesus Christ as God's revelation
and savior of the world. Moreover, in this time in which traditional
Christian doctrine and morality are challenged inside and outside the
church, the Episcopal Church no longer has authoritative, normative moral
teaching on human sexuality and, by implication of this Opinion, on other
moral issues as well. 6. The Court has applied a standard of construction
to the 1979 General Convention Resolution which reaches a strained and
irrational result, violating the usual standard applied to legislative
intention which requires that, where two or more constructions of intention
are possible, the most natural and harmonious construction must be adopted.
Here the Court's construction would impute the ludicrous intention to
General Convention of making a "nonbinding recommendation" that bishops and
others responsible for decisions respecting ordinations apply the Seventh
Commandment. 7. By holding that absent a canonical prohibition the Court
has no authority to enforce moral standards over which questions have been
raised above a minimal level, the Court has thrust upon the Church a need
to create a detailed moral and behavioral code. Until this comes about, if
it ever does, the Church is subject to continuing disorder. 8. The Court's
decision is exceedingly parochial. By basing its conclusion on its own
failure to reach a conclusion about the morality of same gender sexual
relationships and the wholesomeness of the example provided by those
relationships the Court isolates The Episcopal Church from the rest of the
Anglican Communion and the rest of Christendom. The decision is one
further step towards reducing our Church to irrelevance.
+III. Exceptions to The Court's Decision Not to Disqualify Certain Members+
At the outset of the proceeding, Presenters moved to disqualify four members of the Court: Bishop Jones, Bishop Theuner, Bishop Walmsley and Bishop Borsch.[5] Two members, Bishop Jones and Bishop Theuner, had previously ordained noncelibate homosexual persons. They and two others, Bishop Walmsley and Bishop Borsch, had signed the Koinonia Statement in 1994 in which they expressed the belief that the "wholesome example" criteria for ordination did not exclude noncelibate homosexual persons. Both the ordination issue and the credal issue contained in the Koinonia Statement were central to matters before the Court for decision. In the first three sentences of the Opinion, the majority of the Court, which included three of the four Bishops subject to the motion to disqualify, refused to decide those central issues. The Opinion developed a very narrow definition of church doctrine fashioned to avoid a decision on the issues which Presenters asserted were grounds for disqualification.' The decision by the Court overruling Presenters motion to disqualify four members of the Court was dated January 10, 1996. Three days later Bishop Borsch, the Bishop of Los Angeles, participated in the ordination of a noncelibate homosexual person in the Diocese of Los Angeles. Presenters filed a further motion to disqualify Bishop Borsch and also filed an exception to the Court's ruling of January 10, 1996 wherein they noted a continuing objection to the four bishops serving as judges in this case. At the Wilmington hearing on February 27, 1996, the President of the Court announced that the motion as to Bishop Borsch was under advisement. The Opinion of the Court of May 15, 1996 included on page 20 a statement that Bishop Borsch who sat and participated as a member of the Court at the hearing on Doctrine held on February 27, 1996 "recused himself from voting on matters which the Court has considered since the hearing in Wilmington, Delaware on February 27, 1996 and in participating in this matter since April 17, 1996." The extent of his "participation" before April 17, 1996 is not detailed.
The timing of Bishops Borsch's recusal (a) from voting and (b) from participating must be assessed in light of the obvious fact that the Los Angeles ordination was in process long before the Court's decision of January 10, 1996 not to disqualify any of the four Bishops challenged by the Presenters. In that decision, the Court elected not to draw a distinction between "Bishops who voted as Bishop Righter did on a resolution[7] or who signed a Statement in Koinonia as Bishop Righter did and Bishops who ordained a noncelibate homosexual person as Bishop Righter did." The recusal by Bishop Borsch was in response to a motion by Presenters. The same result should have followed from Presenters' motion with respect to the three other challenged members who elected to remain on the Court. Absent recusal. they should have been removed by the remaining members of the Court.
IV. Conclusion
While grateful for the expression of Pastoral Concerns by the Court, the
Presenters are grieved by the absence of the primary pastoral concern of
the bishops of this Church expressed in 1886 when they declared among other
things- "Our earnest desire that the Saviour's prayer, 'That we all may be
one,' may, in its deepest and truest sense, be speedily fulfilled;".
The unity for which our Lord prayed was a unity of heart, mind, and spirit
about all He taught and all that is taught by the Holy Spirit in the Holy
Scripture of the Old and New Testaments. No distinction between kerygma
and didache makes it possible to abandon any of those teachings without
dramatic consequences for that unity and further postponement of its
fulfillment. The Christian Church received its traditional teaching on
sexual morality from these Scriptures and the Court's historic departure
from those standards which "have been believed everywhere, always, and by
all" is as devastating a blow to the unity as it has yet to receive within
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.
JAMES M. STANTON. BISHOP OF
DALLAS, et al.
By Counsel
A. Hugo Blankingship, Jr.
Church Advocate
Rev. Charles G. Flinn
Assistant Church Advocate
4020 University Drive, Suite 12
Fairfax, Virginia 22030