Faculty of Arts and Sciences-Newark - Department of Philosophy

Raffaella DeRosa
Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy
Rutgers University, Newark
175 University Avenue
Conklin Hall 430
Newark, NJ 07102
Email: gabri@andromeda.rutgers.edu

Raffaella DeRosa is an assistant professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, Newark. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, in 2002. After earning a "Laurea" in Philosophy at the University of Pisa, Italy, she was awarded a scholarship to do post-graduate work at Oxford University. Her first job was at the University of South Carolina where she was an assistant professor of Philosophy from the Fall of 2002 until the Spring of 2004.

Her interests lie at the intersection of the history of modern philosophy and philosophy of mind/cognitive science. Of particular interest to her are 17th / 18th century theories of mind and mental representation and contemporary computational theories of cognition and study of concepts.

Her recent work focuses on arguments for conceptual nativism vis-à-vis empiricist accounts of concept acquisition both in the 17th and 18th century and contemporary philosophy of mind and developmental psychology. She is currently working on a book on Descartes' views on sensory representation.

2004,"Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes", in The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.

2004, "Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation: the Case of Materially False Ideas", in the History of Philosophy Quarterly, forthcoming.

2004, "The Question-Begging Status of Locke's Anti-Nativist Arguments", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.69, n1, pp.37-64.

2004, "Quine's Holisms" [co-authored with Ernie Lepore], in The Cambridge Companion to Quine (edited by Roger Gibson), Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 65-90.

2000, "On Fodor's Claim that Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas", in ProtoSociology. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol.14, pp.240-269.

1999, "Is There a Problem about Davidson's Externalism vis-à-vis His Holism?", in M. De Caro (ed), Interpretations and Causes. New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.201-216.

1996, "Donald Davidson: the Problem of Meaning between Truth and Interpretation", in Proceedings of the SIFA (Italian Society of Analytic Philosophy).

2002, "Review of Cowie's What's Within", in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Issue 1, March, 2002.